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Abstract
This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The
meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B,
A allows B, and A allows not-B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes
B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not-A and B, and not-A and not-B, with the temporal
constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the ﬁrst and last of these
possibilities. Individuals represent these relations in mental models of what is true in the various
possibilities. The theory predicts a number of phenomena, and, contrary to many accounts, it implies
that the meaning of causation is not probabilistic, differs from the meaning of enabling conditions, and
does not depend on causal powers or mechanisms. The theory also implies that causal deductions do
not depend on schemas or rules.
1. Introduction
You think about causal relations, because they allow you to infer what will happen.
Drinking too much wine will cause a hangover. Spraying yourself with insect repellent will
prevent mosquitoes from biting you. Taking a short cut will allow you to avoid the trafﬁc.
Reasoning about matters of fact is, as Hume says, largely based on causal relations.
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PII: S0364-0213(01)00046-5Psychologists have studied thinking about causal relations, but they have yet to agree on a
theory of the process (see e.g., White, 1995; Ahn & Bailenson, 1996; Hilton & Erb, 1996;
Cheng, 1997). Like philosophers, they also disagree about the meaning of causal claims. Our
concern is not with the philosophical problems of causation – with whether causes really
exist, with whether, if they do exist, they are objective states in the world or subjective
notions in the mind, or with whether they hold between facts, events, processes, or states of
affairs (cf. Vendler, 1967). Our aim is to develop a psychological account of causal meaning
and reasoning. We assume that causes can concern events, processes, and also states of
affairs, for example, for want of a nail the shoe was lost. And so we will use the neutral
expression, “states of affairs” or “states” for short, to embrace physical or psychological
events, situations, facts, and other potential arguments of causal relations. We have no doubt
that cause exists as an everyday concept, and we suspect that any sound philosophy of
causation must reﬂect this fact. Otherwise, we pass over ﬁne metaphysical distinctions, not
because they are unimportant, but because they would take us too far aﬁeld from our main
goals.
Our concern is with the everyday causal claims and, in particular, with what naive
individuals, that is, those who have not studied philosophy or logic, take such claims to
mean. And our goals are to formulate a psychological theory of the semantics of causation,
to examine its consequences, and to support it with corroboratory evidence. The theory offers
an account of how people think about causality, and it purports to solve three puzzles: ﬁrst,
what causal relations mean; second, how they are mentally represented; and, third, how
people make inferences from them. These questions are logically prior to the problem of the
induction of causal relations from observations. We need to know what is induced before we
can properly understand how it is induced. Our theory also has implications for several
common assumptions:
1. Causation is a probabilistic notion.
2. There is no semantic or logical distinction between causes and enabling conditions.
3. Inferences about causal relations depend on schemas or rules of inference.
If our theory is right, then each of these assumptions is wrong.
The theory is based on mental models. They were originally postulated in order to explain
the comprehension of discourse (e.g., Stevenson, 1993; Garnham & Oakhill, 1996) and
deductive reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Mental models are the end result
of perception, imagination, and the comprehension of discourse (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Each
model corresponds to a possibility, and models are labeled to distinguish physical, deontic,
and logical possibilities (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Causation depends on physical
possibilities. Its counterparts in the other two domains are obligation and logical necessity.
How people determine the status of a possibility–whether it is physical, deontic, or logical–is
an important epistemological problem. It need not detain us, however, since the crucial fact
for us is merely that they do make these distinctions.
The structure and content of a model capture what is common to the different ways in
which the possibility can occur. According to the theory, naive reasoners imagine the states
of affairs described by premises: they construct mental models of them, and they establish
the validity of an inference by checking whether its conclusion holds in these models
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of reasoning. Thus, a conclusion is necessary–it must be the case–if it holds in all the models
of the premises; it is possible–it may be the case–if it holds in at least one of the models; and
its probability–assuming that each model is equiprobable–depends on the proportion of
models in which it holds. However, in order to minimize the load on working memory,
people represent as little information as possible. A fundamental twofold assumption is:
The principle of truth: i. The mental models of a set of assertions represent only those
situations that are possible given the truth of the assertions. ii. Each such model represents
what is described by clauses in the premises (afﬁrmative or negative) only when they are true
within the possibility.
The principle is subtle, and so we illustrate how it works with an example. An exclusive
disjunction: There is a circle or else there is not a cross, calls for two mental models, one for
each possibility, which we represent on separate lines:
o
Ø1
In accordance with the principle of truth, the ﬁrst of these models represents explicitly that
there is a circle, but it does not represent that in this possibility it is false that there is not a
cross. Likewise, the second model represents explicitly that there is not a cross (“Ø” denotes
negation), but it does not represent that in this possibility it is false that there is a circle. The
theory assumes that reasoners try to remember what is false, but that these “mental footnotes”
soon tend to be forgotten. If individuals can keep track of the mental footnotes, they can
envisage fully explicit models. Thus, the mental models of the preceding disjunction can be
ﬂeshed out to yield the fully explicit models:
o 1
Øo Ø 1
Do models never represent what is false? That cannot be the case, because an important
developmental milestone is the ability to pass the “false beliefs” test. Thus, four-year olds are
usually able to distinguish their own beliefs from the false beliefs of another individual (see
e.g., Leslie, 1994). Children are likewise able to engage in pretense, to detect lies and
deception, and to reason on the basis of counterfactual suppositions. They may even be able
to carry out Wason’s (1966) selection task. In all these cases, as Denise Cummins (personal
communication) pointed out, reasoners need to represent what is false. A crucial feature of
false beliefs in studies of the “theory of mind” is that they do not depend on sentential
connectives, that is, they are simple “atomic” beliefs (Alan Leslie, personal communication).
It is straightforward to represent the falsity of such propositions, but it is much harder to
envisage what corresponds to the falsity of an assertion containing several sentential con-
nectives. Even adults do not have direct access to these possibilities but must infer them (see
Johnson-Laird & Barres, 1994).
Experimental evidence has corroborated the model theory (see e.g., Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991). It accounts for reasoning about possibilities (Bell & Johnson-Laird, 1998),
spatial and temporal relations (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989; Schaeken et al., 1996);
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et al., 1999), and the consistency of assertions (Johnson-Laird et al., 2000). Perhaps the best
evidence for the theory derives from its prediction of egregious, but systematic, errors (see
e.g., Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999; Yang & Johnson-Laird, 2000). We return to these
“illusory” inferences in Section 4.
To explain tasks going beyond deduction, we must make additional assumptions. In the
present paper, we frame a new theory based on assumptions about causation. The paper
begins with this theory and its computer implementation (Section 2). It reports studies of
causal meanings that corroborate the theory (Section 3); and it reports studies of causal deduction
that also support it (Section 4). Finally, it considers some implications of the theory and
shows how they dispel several common misconceptions about causation (Section 5).
2. The model theory of causal meanings and reasoning
Our aim is to outline a theory of the meaning of causal relations in everyday life and of
how people reason with them. It is important, however, to distinguish three sorts of assertion:
General causal assertions such as:
Heating pieces of metal causes them to expand;
Singular causal assertions where the outcome is known, such as:
Heating this piece of metal caused it to expand;
and Singular causal assertions where the outcome is not known, such as:
Heating this piece of metal will cause it to expand.
Hume (1748/1988, p. 115) bequeathed us two deﬁnitions of the meaning of causal assertions:
“We may deﬁne a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects,
similar to the ﬁrst, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words, where,
if the ﬁrst object had not been, the second never had existed.” According to his ﬁrst
deﬁnition, the general causal assertion above has the following construal: For any x, if x is
a piece of metal and x is heated then x expands. Similarly, a singular cause where the
outcome is not known has the construal: If this piece of metal is heated then it will expand.
According to Hume’s second deﬁnition, a singular cause where the outcome is known has a
counterfactual construal: If this piece of metal had not been heated then it would not have
expanded.
This section begins with the model theory of causal assertions, and contrasts it with other
current theories, including probabilistic accounts and theories that do not distinguish the
meanings of causes and enabling conditions. It outlines the difference between mental
models and fully explicit models of causal relations. It describes a computer program
implementing the theory. It shows how causal reasoning can be based on models. Finally, it
reviews the principal predictions of the theory.
2.1. The theory of meaning
There are at least ﬁve putative components of causation: temporal order, spatial contigu-
ity, necessary connection, probabilistic connection, and causal powers or mechanisms.
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Lewis, 1973; and Mackie, 1980), and we consider each of them in order to develop the model
theory.
2.1.1. Temporal order
In daily life, the normal constraint on a causal relation between A and B is that B does not
precede A in time (see e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1980; Bullock et al., 1982). Hence, the
model theory postulates:
The principle of temporal constraint: given two states of affairs, A and B, if A has a causal
inﬂuence on B, then B does not precede A in time.
This principle allows that a cause can be contemporaneous with its effect–squeezing the
toothpaste tube, as Paolo Legrenzi noted (personal communication), can be contemporaneous
with the toothpaste coming out of the tube (see Kant, 1781/1934; Taylor, 1966). Teleological
claims–the need to get toothpaste caused the squeezing of the tube–do not violate the
principle granted that a representation of the goal caused the behavior (Daniel Schwartz,
personal communication). Hume (1739/1978) argued that the cause precedes the effect, and
rejected contemporaneity. He ﬁnally declared that the matter was of no great importance. A
causal interpretation of Newton’s theory of gravitation, however, calls for instantaneous
effects at a distance. And individuals violate even our weaker constraint when in discussing
time travel, they assert that an event in the present caused an event in the past. Physicists and
philosophers have likewise speculated about violations of the temporal constraint. For this
reason, we treat it as true for everyday causal assertions, but as deliberately violated in
certain sorts of discourse.
2.1.2. Spatial contiguity
There may be innate constraints on the perception of causal relations as when you see one
object bump into another and cause it to move (Michotte, 1946/1963). This claim is
corroborated by studies of infants’ perception (e.g., Leslie, 1984). It has led Geminiani et al.
(1996), echoing Hume (1739/1978), to argue that adult conceptions of physical causation
depend ultimately on physical contact. Likewise, Lewis (1986) showed that three principles
sufﬁce for a computer program that constructs models of a physical system: every event has
a cause; causes precede their effects; and an action on an object is likely to be the cause of
any change in it. Yet, the concept of causation in daily life is much broader and more abstract
than the perception of cause in simple Michotte-like mechanical events (Miller & Johnson-
Laird, 1976). People often make and understand causal assertions that violate the constraint
of spatial contiguity. They may refer to “action at a distance” in remarks about physical
states, such as: The moon causes the tides, and in statements about psychological states: Pat’s
rudeness caused Viv to get annoyed. We accordingly assume that spatial contiguity–physical
contact–is not a necessary component of the everyday meaning of causal relations. But, it
may underlie many of the inferences that individuals make to explain such claims.
2.1.3. Necessary connection
According to the model theory, the central components of the meanings of causal relations
are the possibilities to which the relations refer:
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causal relation between them concerns what is possible and what is impossible in their
co-occurrences (i.e., “modalities”).
This principle implies a necessary connection between cause and effect. Hume rejected such
a connection in favor of constant conjunction; Kant (1781/1934) restored it, arguing in effect
that it was a component of an innate conception. In everyday life, when we assert A will
cause B, we mean that if A occurs then B must occur. Hence, necessity is part of the meaning
of such claims (see Harre ´ & Madden, 1975).
Following the principle of causal modalities, a singular causal claim of the form A will
cause B means that there are the following possibilities satisfying the temporal constraint:
1. a b
Øab
ØØ b
Each row denotes a model of an alternative possibility. Thus, the models represent the
possibility of A with B, and possibilities in which A does not occur, either with or without
B. The assertion is false if A occurs without B. A general causal claim, A causes B, calls for
just a single model of various possible events within the same situation or “universe of
discourse”:
ab
Øab
Øa Øb
Øa Øb
Each row represents a possibility, and the various possibilities may co-occur in the situation.
The assertion is false if there is a possibility in which A occurs without B. A singular causal
assertion where the outcome is known, A caused B, has a model of the factual situation, and
models representing alternative, but counterfactual, possibilities:
a b (the factual case)
Øa b (a counterfactual possibility)
Øa Øb (a counterfactual possibility)
A counterfactual possibility is a state that was once was a real possibility but that did not, in
fact, occur (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). The falsity of A caused B is slightly more
complicated than the previous cases. It is false, of course, if either A or B did not occur. But,
it can be false even if both A and B occurred, because the relation between them was not
causal. Here the counterfactual possibilities are critical. If they include a case in which A
occurred without B, or in which A occurred after B, then the assertion is false. These factual
and counterfactual representations are consistent with Cheng’s (1997) concept of a “focal”
set.
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singular assertions. For simplicity, we focus on singular causal relations with unknown
outcomes, and we take for granted the temporal constraint. An assertion of the form A will
prevent B means that there are the following possibilities:
2. a Øb
Øab
Øa Øb
If the assertion is false, then there is a possibility in which A occurs with B.
An assertion of the form A will allow B such as: Taking the short cut will allow you to
avoid the trafﬁc, has a strong implicature that not taking the short cut will not allow you to
avoid the trafﬁc. An implicature is an inference that is warranted by pragmatic considerations
(see Grice, 1975; and for an account of how pragmatics is implemented within the model
theory, see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2001). In this case, individuals who speak in an
informative way would not make the claim if they knew that one could just as well avoid the
trafﬁc by not taking the short cut. Thus, an assertion of the form A will allow B means either
that all four contingencies are possible or that there are the following three possibilities
satisfying the implicature:
3 .ab
a Øb
Øa Øb
The assertion is false if there is a possibility in which B occurs in the absence of A. The verb
allow is ambiguous in that it also has a sense of giving permission. Some authors accordingly
prefer to use the verb enable and to talk of “enabling conditions.” Unfortunately, this verb
too can have the same ambiguity (cf. “The Royal toast enabled us to smoke”). In fact, the
ambiguity appears to arise from the fact that both senses can be construed as to make
possible, where in one case the possibility concerns physical matters and in the other case it
concerns deontic matters, that is, what is permissible. In general, we will use “allow” because
“enable” has a connotation that the result was intended. It is odd to assert, for example:
Shoddy work enabled the house to collapse.
An assertion of the form A will allow not B means either that all four contingencies are
possible or that there are the following three possibilities satisfying the implicature:
4. a Øb
ab
Øab
It is sometimes important to distinguish between meaning and implicature, but in what
follows we will not attempt to keep them apart.
The preceding relations are weak, for example, given A will cause B, A is sufﬁcient for
B, but not necessary, because B may have other causes. Indeed, if one ignores the temporal
constraint, the models of causal possibilities capture the notion of sufﬁciency and the models
of enabling possibilities capture the notion of necessity as invoked by various theorists (e.g.,
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weight. You may also gain weight as a result of failing to exercise. In addition to the four
weak relations, there are two strong relations. A, and only A, will cause B means that there
are the following possibilities satisfying the temporal constraint:
5 .ab
Øa Øb
In other words, A is the unique cause and enabler of B. And A, and only A, will prevent B
means that there are the following possibilities satisfying the temporal constraint:
6. a Øb
Øab
A case of strong causation is: Drinking too much alcohol will cause you to get drunk.
Drunkenness has no other cause. The models for the six causal relations are summarized in
Table 2 below.
There is no causal relation if A or B is bound to occur or bound not to occur; and Cheng
& Nisbett (1993) have shown that naive individuals concur with this claim. An assertion such
as: “The rotation of the earth causes the prevailing wind patterns,” might seem like a
counterexample on the grounds that the earth is bound to move. In fact, naı ¨ve individuals
readily envisage the counterfactual possibility that the earth does not rotate, because they
assent to the claim: If the earth were not to rotate then there might be no prevailing wind
patterns. If all you know is that B is bound to occur if A occurs, then you are not entitled to
make any causal claim about the relation between them. On the one hand, B may also be
bound to occur even if A does not occur, that is, there are only the following possibilities:
ab
Øab
and so it would be wrong to invoke a causal relation between A and B. On the other hand,
even granted a causal relation between the two, A could be a strong or a weak cause of B.
The existence of several sorts of causal relation may come as a surprise to the reader.
Philosophers have often seemed to assume that there is only a single relation of cause and
effect, and, according to Lombard (1990), their neglect of enabling conditions has led them
into error.
The general weak relations depend on the temporal constraint and quantiﬁcation over
possible states, that is, the relations are not merely truth-functional:
1. A causes B: for any possibility in which A occurs B occurs.
2. A prevents B: for any possibility in which A occurs B does not occur.
3. A allows B: there is at least one possibility in which A occurs and B occurs.
4. A allows not B: there is at least one possibility in which A occurs and B does not occur.
The assertion: For any possibility in which A occurs B occurs, is logically equivalent to:
There is no possibility in which A occurs and B does not occur. Of course, individuals often
assert general causal claims, such as: Smoking causes cancer, when they know that coun-
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analysis of causation–an analysis that we consider below.
Our account implies that there should be many ways to describe causal relations. This
variety has advantages. Three possibilities are hard to hold in mind at the same time, but one
description can focus on one possibility and another description focus on another possibility:
1. a b A causes B
Øab
Øa Øb Not-A allows not-B
2. a Øb A prevents B
Øa b Not-A allows B
Øa Øb
3. a b A allows B
a Øb
Øa Øb Not-A prevents B
4 .ab
a Øb A allows not-B
Øa b Not-A causes B
The same analysis applies to the large set of verbs that express speciﬁc causal relations, such
as annoy, kill, and break (see Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, Sec. 6.3).
2.1.4. Probabilistic connection
In contrast to the model theory’s modal account, a twentieth century view in philosophy
and psychology is that causation is a probabilistic notion. Reichenbach (1956) proposed such
an analysis, arguing that C causes E if:
p(EïC) . p(EïØC)
where p(EïC) denotes the conditional probability of the effect E given that the putative cause
C occurs, and p(EïØ C) denotes the probability of the effect given that the cause does not
occur. He allowed, however, that a putative cause could be “screened off” if there was an
earlier probabilistic cause, D, yielding both C and E, that is, p(EïC) 5 p( E ïD ) ,a n dp( E ïØ
C) 5 p( E ïØ D). Suppes (1970) defended a similar analysis, even for causation in ordinary
experience (see also Suppes, 1984, p. 54; and Salmon, e.g., 1980, for a defense of a more
sophisticated theory).
A psychological theory of probabilistic causes has been defended by Cheng and her
colleagues (e.g., Cheng & Novick, 1990; see also Schustack, 1988). There are also parallel
probabilistic accounts of the meaning of conditionals (see e.g., Newstead et al., 1997).
“Because causal relations are neither observable nor deducible,” Cheng (1997, p. 367) writes,
“they must be induced from observable events.” She assumes that one observes the differ-
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bilities can be computed from a partition of the events, such as the following one stated with
frequencies of occurrence:
CE 2 8
C ØE3
ØCE 1 0
ØC ØE5 9
The difference between p(E ï C )a n dp( EïØC) is known as the probabilistic contrast.
When it is noticeably positive (as above: 0.76), C causes E; when it is noticeably negative,
C prevents E. The contrast model fails to make the correct predictions for certain causal
inductions, and so Cheng (1997) has proposed a “power probabilistic contrast” model (the
Power PC model) in which the contrast is normalized by dividing it by the base rate for the
effect, that is,1–P ( EïØC).
The main evidence for a probabilistic semantics is that people judge that a causal relation
holds in cases, such as the partition above, in which the antecedent is neither necessary nor
sufﬁcient to bring about the effect (e.g., McArthur, 1972; Cheng & Novick, 1990; Cummins
et al., 1991). One might therefore suppose that causal relations are intrinsically probabilistic.
Certainly, people often induce causal relations from probabilistic data. Yet, our hypothesis
is that the meaning of a causal relation is not probabilistic, though the evidence supporting
it may be probabilistic. We return to this hypothesis later in the light of our experimental
results.
2.1.5. Causal powers or mechanisms
Theorists often invoke some causal power, mechanism, or means of production, over and
above the relevant possibilities (e.g., Harre ´ & Madden, 1975; Ahn et al., 1995; White, 1995;
and Cheng, 1997). One candidate might be a framework of scientiﬁc laws or explanatory
principles (Carnap, 1966). These principles, Hart & Honore ´ (1985) argue, lie behind every
causal assertion about singular events. Another candidate is that “a causal mechanism is the
process by which a cause brings about an effect” (Koslowski, 1996, p. 6). Still another
candidate is the notion that causes produce effects through a transmission of energy or some
other property from cause to effect. “In this sense,” Harre ´ & Madden (1975, p. 5) write,
“causation always involves a material particular which produces or generates something.”
When a hammer is used to smash a plate, for example, a speciﬁc causal power of the hammer
blow produces the effect: the energy in the blow is transferred to the plate, causing it to
break. Theories of causal power accordingly deﬁne causation in terms of the intrinsic
properties of objects. Hume (1739/1978), however, rejected intrinsic properties that produce
effects, arguing that the deﬁnition of production is indistinguishable from that of causation
itself.
The principal evidence for causal power comes from studies showing that beliefs can
override information about the covariation of cause and effect (e.g., White, 1995; Koslowski,
1996). The phenomena, however, do not call for the introduction of causal properties,
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when they have no idea of the underlying causal mechanism, for example: Smoking opium
causes people to fall asleep. Hence, the meaning of many assertions would imply at most
only that some unknown power exists: A causes B means that there exists a mechanism or
power by which A causes B. But, it would then be necessary for theorists to specify what
counts as a causal mechanism or power, or else the existential clause in this analysis is
vacuous. To the best of our knowledge, as Hume anticipated, no-one has succeeded in
formulating a satisfactory deﬁnition of a causal power or mechanism, which itself makes no
reference to causality. Our skepticism, however, in no way impugns the role of known causal
mechanisms in the induction of causal relations–a topic to which we return in the General
Discussion.
2.2. Circumstances and how causes differ in meaning from enabling conditions
The model theory distinguishes between causing an effect and allowing it to occur, that
is, between causes and enabling conditions. Yet, current psychological theories deny that
there is any logical or semantic distinction between the two. The argument, which is
originally due to Mill (1874), inﬂuenced philosophers and jurists ﬁrst, and then psycholo-
gists. It can be illustrated by an example of a singular cause. Consider an explosion that is
caused by the occurrence of a spark in a container of combustible vapor. The explosion
would not have occurred in the absence of the spark, and it would not have occurred in the
absence of the vapor. Hence, both the spark and the vapor are individually necessary and
jointly sufﬁcient to cause the explosion. Yet, people often speak of the spark as the cause of
the explosion, and the presence of the vapor as the enabling condition that allows it to occur.
Likewise, the absence of the spark or the vapor would be a disabling condition that would
not allow the explosion to occur (see Cummins, 1995, 1998). If the difference between
causes and enabling conditions cannot be accounted for by logic or meaning, then what
distinguishes the two? Mill himself thought that the choice of a cause was often capricious,
but he did offer some more systematic answers, as have many other authors.
According to one school of thought, causes are abnormal whereas enabling conditions are
normal. Thus, Hart & Honore ´ (1959/1985) argued that when individuals identify single
causes, they choose the unusual factor as the cause–the spark rather than the vapor in the
example above, or else they choose a voluntary human action. Girotto et al., (1991) have
independently discovered that voluntary human actions are the main events that reasoners
seek to undo in thinking counterfactually about the causes of unfortunate events. Various
ways exist to try to determine what is unusual. One can distinguish what is rare and what is
common (Hart & Honore ´, 1959/1985), what is inconstant and what is constant (Cheng &
Novick, 1991), or what does and does not violate a norm that can be assumed by default (see
e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986).
According to another school of thought, the cause is the factor that is conversationally
relevant in explanations (Mackie, 1980; Turnbull & Slugoski, 1988). Thus, Hilton & Erb
(1996) argue for a two stage process: “explanations are ﬁrst cognitively generated by
building mental models of the causal structure of events, from which particular factors are
identiﬁed in conversationally given explanations” (p. 275). These authors adduce Grice’s
(1975) maxims of conversation as determining the cause, but they allow that other accounts
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recent or precipitating event that is the cause (Mill, 1874), and there are still other views (see
Hesslow, 1988, for a review). Table 1 summarizes the main hypotheses about the distinction
between causes and enabling conditions. Of course, all these components might be true, and
yet we will show that there is a difference in meaning too.
To recapitulate the argument: the model theory entails that a distinction in meaning and
logic exists between causing and allowing. Other psychological theories presuppose that the
two are not logically distinct. Hence, an apparent paradox needs to be resolved. We need to
explain why Mill’s argument seems so compelling. In fact, the answer comes from the subtle
effects of knowledge in determining the circumstances of a cause and effect.
Suppose you observe the following sequence of events: A doctor injects a patient with a
drug, and then the patient loses consciousness. What is the causal relation, if any, between
the two events? The observation is inconsistent with two causal relations: the injection did
not prevent loss of consciousness in either its strong or weak sense. But, it is compatible with
any of the four remaining relations and, of course, with the lack of any causal relation at all.
A corollary of this uncertainty is that the mere observation of a particular sequence of
states–in the absence of knowledge about causal relations–never sufﬁces to establish a
unique causal relation. Even the simple perception of physical causes, as in Michotte’s
(1963) studies, is not a counterexample. The participants saw a causal relation when one
object collided with another and launched it into motion. They were mistaken of course,
because Michotte’s apparatus did not use real physical objects colliding with one another.
Causal relations are modal. They are not merely about what occurred but also about what
might have occurred. What might have occurred, however, cannot be determined from
observation unsupported by knowledge of the circumstances. The model theory accordingly
postulates:
The principle of circumstantial interpretation: Causal interpretation depends on how
people conceive the circumstances of states, that is, on the particular states that they
consider to be possible, whether real, hypothetical, or counterfactual.
Precursors to this idea include Hart & Honore ´’s (1959/1985) and McGill’s (1989) “context”
of a cause, Mackie’s (1980) “causal ﬁeld,” and Cheng & Novick’s (1991) “focal set” of
events. The circumstantial principle, however, implies that you use your general knowledge
Table 1
A summary of hypotheses about the difference between causes and enabling conditions. All these accounts
presuppose that there is no difference in meaning or logic between the two
Distinguishing characteristics Examples of proponents
Causes Enabling conditions
Most recent event Earlier event Mill (1874)
Rare event Common event Hart and Honore ´ (1985)
Inconstant state Constant state Cheng and Novick (1991)
Violates norm Conforms to norm Einhorn and Hogarth (1978)
Relevant to conversation Not relevant Mackie (1980)
Turnbull and Slugoski (1988)
Hilton and Erb (1996)
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claim, one model represents the actual state, and the other models represent the relevant
possibilities in the circumstances. The models ﬁx the appropriate causal relation.
To return to the preceding example, if the circumstances are as follows:
injection loss-of-consciousness
Øinjection loss-of-consciousness
Øinjection Øloss-of-consciousness
an appropriate description is: The injection caused the patient to lose consciousness. If the
circumstances are as follows:
injection loss-of-consciousness
injection Øloss-of-consciousness
Øinjection Øloss-of-consciousness
an appropriate description is: The injection allowed the patient to lose consciousness. And if
the circumstances are as follows:
injection loss-of-consciousness
injection Øloss-of-consciousness
Øinjection loss-of-consciousness
an appropriate description is: The injection did not prevent the patient from losing con-
sciousness.
The truth of an assertion about past states of affairs, such as: The injection caused the
patient to lose consciousness, presupposes that the patient had an injection and that the
patient lost consciousness. But, a causal relation is not true merely because both propositions
that it interrelates are true (Burks, 1951; Mackie, 1980). Even granted the temporal constraint
on the order of the two events, the modal nature of causation is borne out by its support for
counterfactual claims (see Hume, 1748/1988; Mill, 1874; and many recent accounts). A
corollary is that the appropriate description of an observation depends on circumstantial
interpretation. Consider the circumstances of a strong causal relation, such as:
injection loss-of-consciousness
Øinjection Øloss-of-consciousness
With an observation corresponding to the ﬁrst of these models, the appropriate counterfactual
assertion is: If the patient hadn’t had the injection, then he wouldn’t have lost consciousness.
With an observation corresponding to the second of the models, the appropriate counterfac-
tual assertion is: If the patient had had the injection, then he would have lost consciousness.
Counterfactual descriptions are not unique to singular causal claims, as an example from
Lewis (1973) illustrates: If kangaroos had no tails then they would topple over, is just another
way of expressing the general claim: Kangaroos’ tails prevent them from toppling over.
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decisive criteria. That is why the circumstances–the ceteris paribus clause of counterfactual
conditionals–have bedeviled philosophical analyses (e.g., Stalnaker, 1968). They play an
important role in blocking otherwise valid inferences of the following sort (see e.g., Lewis,
1973):
If the match had been struck, then it would have lighted.
[ If the match had been soaked in water and struck, then it would have lighted.
The circumstances of the conclusion are no longer those of the premises. The case is altered;
the conclusion is false even if the premise is true (see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2001, for an
account of how general knowledge modulates the interpretation of such conditionals).
We can now consider again the example illustrating Mill’s argument. A spark in a
combustible vapor causes an explosion. You know that in the presence of the vapor, the spark
causes the explosion, and that in the absence of either the vapor or the spark, there is no
explosion. Your knowledge accordingly yields the circumstances shown in the following
models:
vapor spark explosion
vapor Øspark Øexplosion
Øvapor spark Øexplosion
Øvapor Øspark Øexplosion
The roles of the spark and vapor are equivalent. Jointly, they are the strong cause of the
explosion.
You can envisage other circumstances. Suppose, for example, that a tank is used to
store gasoline, and at present it may or may not contain a combustible vapor. The
presence of the vapor will allow an explosion to occur, and the occurrence of a spark,
or, say, a naked ﬂame will cause an explosion. The circumstances are shown in the
following models:
vapor spark explosion
vapor Øspark explosion
vapor Øspark Øexplosion
Øvapor spark Øexplosion
Øvapor Øspark Øexplosion
The respective roles of the two antecedents are logically distinct. The possible combinations
of vapor and explosion in the set of models are as follows:
vapor explosion
vapor Øexplosion
Øvapor Øexplosion
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and explosion in the set of models are as follows:
spark explosion
spark Øexplosion
Øspark explosion
Øspark Øexplosion
The full set of circumstances, however, shows that given the presence of the vapor, the spark
causes the explosion to occur.
You can envisage circumstances in which the causal roles of the vapor and spark are
interchanged. Suppose, for example, that an induction coil delivers a spark from time to time
in an enclosed canister. You know that the introduction of a combustible vapor will cause an
explosion. You also know that the occurrence of the spark allows such an explosion to occur.
It may even occur without the vapor if, say, an explosive substance such as gunpowder is put
into the canister. The circumstances are as follows:
spark vapor explosion
spark Øvapor explosion
spark Øvapor Øexplosion
Øspark vapor Øexplosion
Øspark Øvapor Øexplosion
The spark allows the explosion to occur, and given its occurrence, the vapor causes the
explosion.
This analysis shows that causes and enabling conditions are distinct, and that they
reﬂect the modal and circumstantial principles. The respective probabilities of each of
the possibilities can make one antecedent common and the other antecedent rare, but the
probabilities have no bearing on their causal roles (pace Hart & Honore ´, 1959/1985).
Indeed, the switch in causal roles from one set of circumstances to the other shows that
none of the factors in Table 1 is essential to distinguishing between causes and enabling
conditions. Causes need not be unusual or abnormal, and they need not be pragmatically
relevant to explanations. Cheng & Novick’s (1991) experiments corroborated both these
claims, and their theory of causal induction also relies on sets of possibilities. But, they
argued that enabling conditions are constant in a set of possibilities whereas causes are
not constant (see also Cheng, 1997). It is true that enabling conditions are constant in
some circumstances. But, our preceding examples show that constancy in the circum-
stances is not necessary for an enabling condition. Neither the spark nor the vapor is
constant in the circumstances above, yet their logical roles are distinct, and one is an
enabling condition for the other to function as a cause.
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Our preceding analysis of the meanings of causal relations is in terms of fully explicit
models. The principle of truth, however, predicts that naive individuals will tend to rely on
the corresponding mental models for each of the causal relations. An assertion of the form:
A will cause B, calls for the mental models:
ab
...
in which the ellipsis represents implicitly possibilities in which the antecedent, A, does not
hold. There is a mental footnote to capture this fact–in effect, A cannot occur in the
possibilities represented by the implicit model. Given the mental footnote, it is possible to
ﬂesh out the models fully explicitly as:
ab
Øab
Øa Øb
The theory postulates that individuals normally reason on the basis of mental models, but
with simple assertions of the present sort, they can appreciate that A will cause B is
compatible with B having other causes. Given time, they may even enumerate all three
explicit possibilities. Strong causation as expressed by A, and only A, will cause B has the
same mental models as weak causation, but the mental footnote indicates that neither A nor
B can occur in the possibilities represented by the implicit model, and so the only way to
ﬂesh out the model fully explicitly is as shown below:
ab
Øa Øb
An assertion of the form: A will prevent B, relies on a negative verb (Clark & Clark, 1977),
and so it means that if A occurs then B does not occur in the circumstances:
a Øb
...
where there is a mental footnote indicating that A cannot occur in the possibilities repre-
sented by the implicit model. Again, individuals may be able to enumerate the explicit
possibilities, but normally they should use mental models to think about the relation.
Analogous considerations apply to assertions of the form: A allows B, and A allows not B.
2.4. The computational implementation of the theory
We have developed a computer program of the model theory. Its input is a set of causal
assertions, and it constructs the corresponding set of mental models and, for purposes of
comparison, the set of fully explicit models. It also draws the causal conclusion, if any, that
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it relies on a lexical semantics for causal verbs, and a compositional semantics with semantic
rules for each rule in the grammar to assemble the models. The models for each of the six
singular causal relations with unknown outcomes are summarized in Table 2. When the
outcome is known, the remaining models represent counterfactual states. The models in the
table also stand for general causal assertions, but in this case each row represents an
alternative possibility within the same situation.
The program conjoins sets of models according to the procedures summarized in
Table 3. These procedures combine separate possibilities, either those corresponding to
models of singular causal assertions or those in models of general causal assertions.
Readers will recall that for general assertions, the theory postulates that reasoners construct a
single model representing the different sorts of possibilities. We make no strong claims that
reasoners form separate models and then combine them; they might instead add information
from a premise to an existing model or set of models (see e.g., Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird,
1999). In either case, however, the process yields the same end results.
Different sorts of model support different sorts of conclusions. In particular, the program
uses a single model of the possibilities:
ac
...
to draw the general conclusion, A causes C. From a single model of the form:
Table 2
The models for the six singular causal relations with unknown outcomes. The central column shows the
mental models normally used by human reasoners, and the right-hand column shows the fully explicit
models, which represent the false components of the true cases using negations that are true: “Ø” denotes
negation and “. . .” denotes a wholly implicit possibility. The mental models for the strong and weak relations
of cause and prevention differ only in their mental footnotes (see text).
Connective Mental models Fully Explicit models
1. A will cause B: A B A B
... ØAB
ØA ØB
2. A will prevent B: A ØBA ØB
... ØAB
ØA ØB
3. A will allow B: A B A B
... A ØB
ØA ØB
4. A will allow not-B: A ØBA ØB
... A B
ØAB
5. A and only A will cause B: A B A B
... ØA ØB
6. A and only A will prevent B: A ØBA ØB
... ØAB
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it draws the conclusion, A allows C. The program draws negative conclusions from two sorts
of models, which both must contain negative tokens, either of an end term or a middle term.
The model:
a Øc
...
and the model:
a
c
...
yield the conclusion, A prevents C. Likewise, the model:
a Øc
a
...
and the model:
Table 3
The procedures for forming a conjunction of two sets of possibilities. The procedures apply either to
individual models (based on singular causal relations) or to individual possibilities (based on general causal
relations). Each procedure is presented with an accompanying example. In principle, each procedure should
take into account mental footnotes, but reasoners soon forget them. The program implementing the theory
also reasons at more advanced levels, ﬁrst taking footnotes into account, and then constructing fully
explicit models.
1. For a pair of explicit items, the result conjoins their elements, and drops any duplicates:
a b and b c yieldabc
2. For a pair of items that contain an element and its contradiction, the result is null (akin to the empty set):
a b and Øb c yield null
3. For null combined with any item, the result is null:
null and a b yield null
4. For a pair of implicit items, the result is implicit:
. . . and . . . yield . . .
5. For an implicit item combined with an explicit one, the result by default is null:
. . . and b c yield null
But, if the explicit item contains no element in common with anything in the same set from which the
implicit item is drawn, then the result is the explicit item:
. . . and b c yield b c
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yield the conclusion, A allows not-C.
We illustrate how the program works by elucidating the contrast between causal forks and
causal chains. Fisher (1959) argued that smoking might not be a cause of lung cancer, and
that instead there could be an unknown gene, X, that both causes people to smoke and
independently causes them to get lung cancer. If they have the deadly gene then they are
likely to develop cancer whether or not they smoke. If they do not have the deadly gene then
they are unlikely to develop cancer whether or not they smoke. Ergo, they might as well
smoke. A contrasting view is that a causal chain occurs: the gene causes smoking, and
smoking causes cancer. Given the assertions for a causal fork:
Gene causes smoking.
Gene causes cancer.
the program constructs the following fully explicit model:
Gene Smoking Cancer
ØGene Smoking Cancer
ØGene Smoking ØCancer
ØGene ØSmoking Cancer
ØGene ØSmoking ØCancer
The causal fork allows a possibility in which smoking occurs without cancer. In contrast,
given the assertions for a chain of weak causes:
Gene causes smoking.
Smoking causes cancer.
the program constructs the following set of fully explicit models:
Gene Smoking Cancer
ØGene Smoking Cancer
ØGene ØSmoking Cancer
ØGene ØSmoking ØCancer
Both the gene and smoking cause cancer.
2.5. Deductive inferences from causal relations
Some theorists suppose that causes cannot be deduced, but only induced. But, the causal
status of an observation can be deduced from knowledge of its circumstances. For example,
suppose you know that a certain anesthetic causes a loss of consciousness, and you observe
that a patient who is given the anesthetic loses consciousness. You can deduce that the
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There are three potential answers.
The ﬁrst answer is that you rely on formal rules of inference (see e.g., Braine & O’Brien,
1998). One such account (Osherson, 1974-6) includes a fragment of modal logic, and Rips
(1994, p. 336) has suggested that formal rules might be extended to deal with causal
reasoning. Likewise, philosophers have proposed axiomatic systems for causal deductions
(e.g., von Wright, 1973). Hence, causal deductions could depend on axioms (or “meaning
postulates”) of the following sort: If X causes Y, and Y prevents Z, then X prevents Z, where
X, Y, and Z, are variables that take states as their values.
The second answer is that you make causal inferences relying on pragmatic reasoning
schemas (e.g., Cheng et al., 1986). For instance, the preceding axiom is framed instead as a
rule of inference:
X causes Y.
Y prevents Z.
[ X prevents Z.
This rule and others make up a pragmatic schema, and causal reasoning as a whole
could depend on several such schemas. The idea goes back to Kelley’s (1973) theory of
causal attribution, which postulated such schemas for checking causal relations. Morris
& Nisbett (1993), for example, formulated a schema that includes the following two
rules:
If cause A is present then effect B occurs.
Cause A is present.
[ Effect B occurs.
and:
If cause A is present then effect B occurs.
Effect B does not occur.
[ Cause A is not present.
Inferences about causation tend to be easier than equivalent inferences based on conditionals,
at least in Wason’s selection task (e.g., Markovits & Savary, 1992). Hence, Morris & Nisbett
(1993) argue that schemas guide causal deduction, and that this claim is supported by the fact
that graduate students in psychology improve in causal reasoning whereas those in philos-
ophy do not. These phenomena, however, are open to alternative explanations–content and
experience may, for example, enable individuals to ﬂesh out their models of possibilities
more explicitly (cf. Green & Over, 2000).
The third answer is that naive reasoners make causal deductions, not by using rules or
schemas, but by constructing mental models. Given the appropriate temporal constraints and,
say, the following mental model of possibilities:
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they can validly infer: A causes C, because the model contains each of the possibilities
required for this relation. In practice, naive individuals may not construct fully explicit
models. The theory accordingly postulates:
The principle of causal deduction:
Causal deductions are based on models of the premises, and with complex premises, these
models will tend to be mental models rather than fully explicit models. Granted the
appropriate temporal constraints, a conclusion is valid if the set of premise possibilities
corresponds to the set for the conclusion.
2.6. The predictions of the theory
The model theory makes three main empirical predictions. First, it predicts that the
meanings of causal relations are modal, and so naı ¨ve individuals should consider that each
sort of causal relation rules out certain states of affairs as impossible. In contrast, probabi-
listic accounts of the meaning of, say, A will cause B, are compatible with any possibility,
because only the relative frequencies of possibilities matter. Second, the model theory
predicts that causes and enabling conditions differ in meaning. Hence, naı ¨ve individuals
should judge that different possibilities are compatible with assertions of the form, A will
cause B and A will allow B (see Table 2). Likewise, they should draw different deductive
conclusions from the two sorts of assertion. In contrast, the theories summarized in Table 1
draw no such distinction in the meaning and logic of causes and enabling conditions.
Similarly, probabilistic theories have difﬁculty in distinguishing between causes and en-
abling conditions, and predict that no necessary conclusions will be drawn from them. Third,
the principle of causal deduction implies that some valid deductions should be easier than
others: those based on mental models should be drawn more accurately than those that call
for fully explicit models. Theories based on schemas and rules might be framed to make the
same prediction. Only the model theory, however, predicts the occurrence of “illusory”
inferences arising from the failure to represent what is false. In what follows, we describe a
series of experiments designed to test these predictions.
3. Studies of causal meanings
The aim of our initial experiment was to test the model theory’s prediction that naive
individuals should treat some states as possible and some as impossible for each causal
relation, and the prediction that cause differs in meaning from allows. In addition, however,
according to the principle of truth, the ﬁrst true possibility the participants should envisage
should correspond to the explicit mental model of the relation. Hence, for A will cause B, the
ﬁrst possibility that the participants envisage should be A and B; for A will prevent B, the ﬁrst
possibility should be A and not-B; for A will allow B, the ﬁrst possibility should be A and
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be quite hard to ﬂesh out the mental models to make them fully explicit, the status of the
remaining true possibilities, which correspond to those only in fully explicit models, should be
more difﬁcult for the participants to determine, and so they may fail to enumerate them correctly.
3.1. Experiment 1: modal meanings
To understand the meaning of an assertion is at least to grasp what it allows as possible
and what it rules out as impossible. Because no previous study had examined this aspect of
causal relations, our ﬁrst experiment was a study of possibilities. The participants’ task was
to list what was possible and what was impossible given each of the four weak causal
assertions. We distinguish this task from one in which participants have to decide whether
an assertion is true or false in various situations. This second task calls for a meta-linguistic
grasp of the predicates “true” and “false,” whereas listing possibilities, according to the
model theory, taps into a more fundamental ability to grasp the meaning of assertions (see
Johnson-Laird & Barres, 1994).
The assertions in the experiment concerned singular causal relations with unknown
outcomes, and so they were of the form:
1. A will cause B.
2. A will prevent B.
3. A will allow B.
4. A will allow not B.
We also included a control assertion, which was a tautology of the following form:
5. A or not A will cause B or not B.
which is compatible with all four possibilities. To ensure that there was no confounding
between contents and causal relations, we used ﬁve different contents rotated over the ﬁve
assertions.
Method. The participants listed both possible cases and impossible cases for the 25 asser-
tions, which were presented in a different random order to each participant. The ﬁve contents,
which were rotated over the relations, concerned health and the performance of mechanical
systems. We aimed to select materials that were meaningful to the participants but that made
sense in all of the causal relations. The contents are illustrated here:
1. Generating a strong reactivity will cause damage to the reactor.
2. Having a spinal implant will prevent Vivien from being in pain.
3. Using the new fuel will allow the engine to survive the test.
4. Eating protein will allow her not to gain weight.
5. Running the new application will cause the computer to crash.
The participants were presented with an assertion, and their task was to write down what
was possible and what was impossible given the assertion. They were free to write the items
in any order. And they were told explicitly that there were four cases to consider for each
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undergraduates individually, and they were paid $4 for their participation.
Results and Discussion. Table 4 presents the most frequent interpretations for each of the ﬁve
sorts of assertion, and the numbers of participants who made each interpretation three or
more times out of the ﬁve trials. The results corroborated the predictions of the model theory.
First, the participants generated both true and false possibilities for the causal relations (19
participants did so more often than not, Binomial p , .0001). Second, the participants tended
to start their list with the possibility corresponding to the explicit mental model of the causal
relation (all 20 participants did so more often than not, p 5 .5
20). Third, the participants
sometimes failed to list all four of the possibilities as either true or false. They listed a mean
number of 3.75 possibilities, and seven of the participants failed to list all four possibilities
on at least one occasion. As Table 4 shows, the participants tended to make “strong”
interpretations, that is, to minimize the number of possibilities that are true. Overall, their
interpretations coincided with the model theory’s predictions. There are 16 possible inter-
pretations, and so the chance probability of making a predicted strong or weak interpretation
is 1/8. There was a signiﬁcant tendency to make the predicted interpretations for cause
(Binomial, p , 1 in a billion) and for prevent (Binomial, p , 1 in a billion). The only
unexpected result was the tendency of allow and allow not to elicit strong interpretations.
Nevertheless, there was a reliable tendency to treat allow as signifying either all possibilities
or the three possibilities taking into account the implicature (Binomial, p , .0003), and to
treat allow not as signifying the predicted interpretation (Binomial, p , .01).
If causal relations are probabilistic, then all four cases are possible and nothing is
impossible, because it is only the relative frequencies of the different cases that matter. But,
contrary to probabilistic theories, the participants generated both true and false possibilities
Table 4
The patterns of response to the ﬁve causal relations in Experiment 1, and the number of participants (n 5 20)
generating each of them on at least three trials out of ﬁve. The table shows only those interpretations made
by more than one participant.
The participants’ interpretations
Listed as possible a b a b a b a b a b
a Øba Øba Øba Øba Øb
Øab Øab ØabØab Øab
Øa Øb Øa Øb Øa Øb Øa Øb Øa Øb
Listed as impossible a b a b
—a Øba Øb
Øab Øab
Øa Øb Øa Øb Totals
Tautology: 13 6 19
A will cause B: 9 10 19
A will allow B: 4 10 5 19
A will prevent B: 3 14 17
A will allow not B: 10 7 17
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teristics of the experiment, and particularly the instruction to list what was possible and
impossible. However, more than half the participants were prepared to list all four possibil-
ities as true in the case of the tautology. Likewise, they showed a reliable consensus about
what possibilities were ruled out by each sort of assertion. Hence, the demand characteristics
of the experiment cannot explain the results. The results also showed that naı ¨ve individuals
do distinguish between the meaning of causes and enabling conditions (contrary to the theories
in Table 1). We carried out a similar experiment using general causal claims, and its results
also corroborated the model theory. In sum, both experiments supported the model theory.
3.2. Experiment 2: causes and enabling conditions
If individuals are given a set of possibilities, it is plausible to suppose that they should be
able to produce an appropriate causal description of them. But, previous studies in which
participants have to describe sets of possibilities have merely resulted in descriptions of each
separate possibility in a long disjunction (see e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1992). Cheng &
Novick (1991) used an alternative way to give individuals a set of possibilities. They
presented descriptions of the circumstances without using any causal expressions. The
participants’ task was to identify the causes and the enabling conditions within these
descriptions. The model theory predicts that they should be able to carry out this task.
Moreover, if the theory is correct, then they ought to be able to discern the difference
between the two in the same circumstances. Cheng and Novick reported such an effect, but
they relied on scenarios with constant enabling conditions and inconstant causes. Our next
experiment accordingly examined circumstances in which neither causes nor enabling
conditions were constant.
The aim of the experiment was to determine whether naı ¨ve individuals could distinguish
causes and enabling conditions when neither was constant in the circumstances of the same
scenario. Consider, for example, the following description:
1. Given that there is good sunlight, if a certain new fertilizer is used on poor ﬂowers, then
they grow remarkably well. However, if there is not good sunlight, poor ﬂowers do not
grow well even if the fertilizer is used on them.
Logically speaking, we can paraphrase and abbreviate this description as follows:
If sunlight then if fertilizer then growth; and if not sunlight then not growth.
The corresponding circumstances are the following fully explicit models of the possibilities,
as constructed by the computer program:
Sunlight Fertilizer Growth
Sunlight ØFertilizer Growth
Sunlight ØFertilizer ØGrowth
ØSunlight Fertilizer ØGrowth
ØSunlight ØFertilizer ØGrowth
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Sunlight Growth
Sunlight ØGrowth
ØSunlight ØGrowth
But, the presence of sunlight also makes the fertilizer act as a cause of the ﬂowers growing
well.
In contrast, consider the following description:
2. Given the use of a certain new fertilizer on poor ﬂowers, if there is good sunlight then
the ﬂowers grow remarkably well. However, if the new fertilizer is not used on poor
ﬂowers, they do not grow well even if there is good sunlight.
This yields the following fully explicit models of the possibilities:
Sunlight Fertilizer Growth
ØSunlight Fertilizer Growth
ØSunlight Fertilizer ØGrowth
Sunlight ØFertilizer ØGrowth
ØSunlight ØFertilizer ØGrowth
The causal roles have been swapped around: the fertilizer is the enabling condition and its
presence makes the sunlight act as the cause of the ﬂowers’ growth. In these scenarios, cause
and enabling condition differ in their meaning and logic. The experiment accordingly
replicated Cheng & Novick’s (1991) study but used scenarios in which neither causes nor
enabling conditions were constant.
Method. We prepared eight pairs of descriptions, such as the fertilizer examples above, in
which there were two precursors to the effect and their respective roles as enabling condition
and cause were counterbalanced in the two descriptions. We also prepared versions of the
pairs of descriptions in which we reversed the order of mention of cause and enabling
condition. Thus, corresponding to the preceding pair of examples, there were descriptions as
follows:
19. If a certain new fertilizer is used on poor ﬂowers, then given that there is good
sunlight, they grow remarkably well. However, if there is not good sunlight, poor
ﬂowers do not grow well even if the fertilizer is used on them.
29. If there is good sunlight, then given the use of a certain new fertilizer, poor ﬂowers
grow remarkably well. However, if the new fertilizer is not used on poor ﬂowers, they
do not grow well even if there is good sunlight.
The participants acted as their own controls and read eight descriptions that each con-
cerned a cause, an enabling condition, and an effect. They also read two ﬁller items–one in
which there were two joint causes and one in which there were no causes. Each participant
encountered just one version of a particular description, but two instances of the four sorts
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each participant.
We tested 20 Princeton Undergraduates, who were fulﬁlling a course requirement. Their
task was to identify the enabling condition and the cause in each scenario. As in Cheng and
Novick’s study, the participants were given a minimal instruction about the difference
between causes and enabling conditions. They were told that the cause of an event brings
about the event, and the enabling condition makes the event possible, but these terms did not
occur in the scenarios themselves. The participants were told that some passages did not
contain an enabling condition.
Results and discussion. The participants correctly identiﬁed the enabling conditions and
causes on 85% of trials, and every participant was correct more often than not (p 5 .5
20).
Likewise, all the eight scenarios conformed to this trend (p 5 .5
8). Hence, individuals given
descriptions of scenarios that make no reference to causation can distinguish enabling
conditions from causes. Contrary to a long-established tradition from Mill (1874) onwards,
we conclude that causes and enabling conditions do differ in meaning, that naive individuals
can distinguish between them, and that they can base their distinction on independent
descriptions of the relevant sets of possibilities. These descriptions rely essentially on
conditionals, and, unlike those of Cheng and Novick, the contrast is not based on making
enabling conditions constant in the scenario and causes inconstant. It follows that none of the
contrasts in Table 1 is essential to the distinction between causes and enabling conditions.
They can at best make predictions about only one of our matched pairs of scenarios in which
the causal roles are swapped around. Likewise, as we will show in the General Discussion,
the results count against probabilistic theories of causation. Are there cases where prior
knowledge blocks the swapping around of cause and effect (Daniel Schwartz, personal
communication)? Indeed, there are likely to be such cases. Knowledge modulates the
interpretation of assertions and can rule out possibilities compatible with them (see Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 2001, for an account of this process). Thus, consider the following descrip-
tion:
Given that there is sunlight, if there is water, then the plants grow. However, if there is no
sunlight, the plants do not grow even if there is water.
It ought to yield possibilities corresponding to those for description 1 above. However, your
knowledge of the need for water is likely to eliminate the possibility:
Sunlight ØWater Growth
and so you will treat sunlight and water as joint causes of growth.
4. Studies of causal reasoning
Reasoning is based on the representation of assertions. In this section, we report three
studies that tested the predictions of the model theory about reasoning from causal assertions.
The results of the preceding studies showed that naı ¨ve individuals distinguish the difference
in meaning between A will cause B and A will allow B. This difference in meaning, which
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individuals are given the following premises:
Eating protein will cause her to gain weight.
She will eat protein.
the model theory predicts that they should tend to draw the conclusion: She will gain weight.
But, if they are given analogous premises based on allow:
Eating protein will allow her to gain weight.
She will eat protein.
the theory predicts that they should be less likely to draw the conclusion: She will gain
weight. Likewise, the following premises based on prevent:
Eating protein will prevent her from gaining weight.
She will eat protein.
should tend to elicit the conclusion: She will not gain weight. But, the analogous premises
based on allow-not should be less likely to elicit this conclusion. The model theory makes
analogous predictions about inferences based on the categorical denial of the proposition that
occurs in the consequent of the causal claim. Thus, premises of the form:
A will cause B.
Not-B.
should be more likely to elicit the conclusion: Not-A, than analogous premises based on
allow. Likewise, premises of the form:
A will prevent B.
B.
should be more likely to elicit the conclusion: Not-A, than analogous premises based on
allow-not.
The principle of causal deduction (see Section 2) implies that some causal deductions
should be easier than others. In particular, those for which mental models sufﬁce should yield a
high percentage of correct conclusions. For example, consider a problem of the following form:
A causes B.
B prevents C.
What, if anything, follows?
It should be easy to draw a conclusion of the form: A prevents C, because the conclusion
holds in the mental model of the premises. As the computer program shows, the premises:
A causes B: a b
...
B prevents C: b Øc
...
yield a single integrated mental model:
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...
where each row represents a possibility in the model. This model contains the possibilities
corresponding to A prevents C. This conclusion is valid, because it holds in the fully explicit
model of the premises:
ab Øc
Øab Øc
Øa Øbc
Øa Øb Øc
In contrast, consider the following problem:
A prevents B.
B causes C.
What, if anything, follows?
The mental model of the premises is as follows:
a Øb
bc
...
The possibility containing A does not contain C, and so reasoners should draw the conclu-
sion: A prevents C. The conclusion is wrong, however. The fully explicit model of the two
premises is:
a Øbc
a Øb Øc
Øabc
Øa Øbc
Øa Øb Øc
As this model shows, A does not prevent C. In fact, there is no causal relation between them.
4.1. Experiment 3: the logical properties of causes and enabling conditions
Experiment 3 was designed to test the predictions about the difference between inferences
based on cause and allow, and prevent and allow not. The participants were given pairs of
premises using these four causal relations coupled with categorical assertions of all four sorts
(the antecedent state, the consequent state, and their respective negations). The four key
comparisons for the model theory are shown in Table 5 below. The other eight inferences in
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make strong interpretations of the causal relations.
Method. The participants acted as their own controls and carried out sixteen problems. Each
problem consisted of two premises followed by a question, for example:
Eating protein will cause her to gain weight.
She will eat protein.
Will she gain weight?
Yes. No. Perhaps yes, perhaps no.
The participants were told to circle “yes” if the proposition in the question followed logically
from the premises, that is, the proposition must be true given that the premises are true, to
circle “no” if the negation of the proposition in the question followed logically from the
premises, that is, the proposition must be false given that the premises are true, and to circle
“Perhaps yes, perhaps no” if neither the proposition in the question nor its negation followed
logically from the premises. The problems were composed from the four causal relations
paired with the afﬁrmation or denial of the antecedent or consequent proposition. We devised
16 sets of contents, half of which concerned singular events about persons and half of which
concerned singular events about mechanical systems. We assigned them twice at random to
the 16 forms of inference in order to produce two versions of the materials.
The participants were 129 of the best high school graduates in Italy, with a mean age of
approximately 19 years, who were applicants to the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna of Pisa, a
highly selective Italian university.
Results and discussion. Table 5 presents the percentages of predicted results for the crucial
problems. In each case, the comparisons were in the direction that the model theory
predicted, and each of them was highly signiﬁcant on a Sign test, that is, considerably less
improbable than one in a billion. In particular, given premises of the form: A will cause B,
Table 5
The 8 crucial forms of inferential problems in Experiment 3. The table presents the percentages of the
participants who drew the responses shown in the table.
The second premise
A Not-B
The ﬁrst premise:
A will cause B [ B: 93 [ Not-A: 93
A will allow B [ B: 30 [ Not-A: 47
The second premise
AB
The ﬁrst premise:
A will prevent B [ Not-B: 85 [ Not-A: 82
A will allow not B [ Not-B: 36 [ Not-A: 36
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will allow B, A (85 participants ﬁt the prediction, 2 went against it, and the rest were ties).
Given premises of the form: A will cause B, not-B, reasoners drew the conclusion, not-A,
reliably more often than from premises of the form: A will allow B, not-B (64 participants ﬁt
the prediction, 5 went against it, and the rest were ties). Similarly, given premises of the
form: A will prevent B, A, reasoners drew the conclusion, not-B, reliably more often than
from premises of the form: A will allow not B, A (70 participants ﬁt the prediction, 6 went
against it, and the rest were ties). Given premises of the form: A will prevent B, B, reasoners
drew the conclusion, not-A, reliably more often than from premises of the form: A will allow
not B, B (64 participants ﬁt the prediction, 6 went against it, and the rest were ties). These
results show that the pattern of inferences from cause and allow are quite distinct, and that
the pattern of inferences from prevent and allow-not are also quite distinct. We conclude that
the model theory’s account of the difference in meaning between the causal relations is
upheld. Causes and enabling conditions differ in meaning and hence in the inferences that
they support. The result is incompatible with probabilistic theories – a point to which we
return in the General Discussion, and it is also incompatible with the many theories that
presuppose that causes and enabling conditions do not differ in meaning (see Table 1).
4.2. Experiment 4: deductions from two causal premises
The goal of Experiment 4 was to test the principle of causal deduction. The participants’
task was to draw conclusions in their own words from pairs of premises. The ﬁrst premise
Table 6
The inferences in Experiment 4, their mental models, the conclusions they predict, and the frequencies with
which the participants (N 5 20) drew them. Valid conclusions are in capital letters.
Second premise First premise
A causes B A allows B A prevents B Not-A causes B
B causes C a b c a b c a Øb Øabc
... a b c ...
A CAUSES C: 20 A allows...C :1 8 A...prevents CL 19 Not-A CAUSES C: 20
B allows C a b c a b c a Øb Øabc
ab ab bc Øab
... a b ...
... ...
A allows C: 19 A ALLOWS C: 19 A PREVENTS C: 20 Not-A allows C: 20
B prevents C a b Øca b Øca Øb Øab Øc
... a b Øc ...
... ...
A PREVENTS C: 20 A allows not-C: 14 A prevents C: 15 Not-A PREVENTS C: 20
Not-B causes C a b a b a Øbc Øab
Øbc a Øb c ... Øbc
... a ...
Øbc
...
A prevents C: 9 A ALLOWS Not-C: 12 A CAUSES C: 17 Not-A prevents C: 15
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A allows B, A prevents B, and Not-A causes B), and the second premise interrelated two states
of affairs, B and C, using one of the same set of causal relations. Table 6 presents the
16 pairs of premises and the predictions of the computer program based on mental
models. It predicts that reasoners should draw a conclusion in all 16 cases. Half of these
conclusions are valid, but half of them are invalid. Those inferences should be difﬁcult
for which a discrepancy occurs between the conclusion based on the mental model of the
premises and the conclusion based on the fully explicit model of the premises. Naive
individuals should tend to draw the conclusion predicted by the mental model. Neither
formal rules nor pragmatic schemas, as they are currently formulated, make any pre-
dictions about these deductions.
Method. Each participant carried out in a random order all 16 possible inferences based on
the four sorts of premise in the following ﬁgure:
A-B .
B-C .
The content of the premises consisted of psychological terms that were familiar to the
participants, but not so familiar that they would elicit strong beliefs about the truth or falsity
of the premises. We used two random allocations of the contents to the set of 16 problems.
A typical problem was as follows:
Obedience allows motivation to increase.
Increased motivation causes eccentricity.
What, if anything, follows?
The instructions made clear that although the contents were sensible, it was not crucial for
the participants to know precisely what each term meant. Their task was to state in their own
words whatever conclusion, if any, followed from the premises, that is, a conclusion must be
true given that the premises were true. We tested individually 20 Princeton undergraduates,
who received $4 for participating in the experiment.
Results and discussion. Table 6 presents the numbers of participants drawing the main
conclusions to each of the sixteen inferences. The participants tended to draw the predicted
conclusions whether they were valid (93% of conclusions) or invalid (80% of conclusions).
Each participant drew more predicted than unpredicted conclusions (p 5 0.5
20) and 15 out
of the 16 inferences yielded more predicted than unpredicted conclusions (Sign test,
p , .0005). In sum, the results supported the principle of causal deduction. The one inference
for which the model theory’s prediction failed was of the form:
A causes B.
Not-B causes C.
The model theory predicts the invalid conclusion: A prevents C, which was drawn by nine
of the participants. Eight other participants drew the weaker conclusion: A allows not-C. This
conclusion is valid, ignoring the implicature that not-A does not allow not-C.
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verbs that occurred in the premises? For example, given premises of the form:
A causes B.
B causes C.
they might have been biased to draw a conclusion with the same verb: A causes C. Although
we cannot rule out the possibility that such “atmosphere” effects sometimes occur, they
cannot explain the results as a whole. For example, given premises of the form:
Not-A causes B.
Not-B causes C.
atmosphere predicts the invalid conclusion: Not-A causes C. The model theory, however,
predicts a different invalid conclusion: Not-A prevents C, which the majority of participants
(75%) drew. Alleged atmosphere effects in other domains of reasoning are likewise open to
alternative explanations based on the use of models in reasoning (Bucciarelli & Johnson-
Laird, 1999).
4.3. Experiment 5: illusory inferences about causal relations
The previous experimental results could conceivably be explained by a theory based on
formal rules or pragmatic schemas. So, is there any way to strengthen our claim that
reasoners rely on mental models? The answer depends on an unexpected prediction. Ac-
cording to the principle of truth, mental models fail to represent what is false, and so certain
premises give rise to illusory inferences: most people draw one and the same conclusion,
which seems obvious, and yet which is wrong. Such illusory inferences occur in deductive
reasoning based on sentential connectives (Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999) and quantiﬁers
(Yang & Johnson-Laird, 2000). They occur in modal reasoning about possibilities (Goldvarg
& Johnson-Laird, 2000), in probabilistic reasoning (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999), and in
reasoning about consistency (Johnson-Laird et al., 2000). The illusions provide a strong
support for the model theory, and they are contrary to current rule theories. These theories
use only valid rules of inference (see e.g., Rips, 1994; Braine & O’Brien, 1998), and so they
cannot account for a phenomenon in which most people draw one and the same invalid
conclusion.
Because illusory inferences occur in reasoning about possibilities, they should also occur
in causal reasoning. As an example of a potential illusion, consider the following problem
based on singular causal assertions:
One of these assertions is true and one of them is false:
Marrying Evelyn will cause Vivien to relax.
Not marrying Evelyn will cause Vivien to relax.
The following assertion is deﬁnitely true:
Vivien will marry Evelyn.
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The mental models of the initial disjunction of premises are as follows:
Marry Relax
ØMarry Relax
The premise that is deﬁnitely true eliminates the second of these models, and so it seems to
follow that Vivien will relax. But, the models of the initial disjunction fail to represent what
is false, that is, when the ﬁrst premise is true, the second premise is false, and vice versa. If
it is false that marrying Evelyn will cause Vivien to relax, but true that Vivien will marry
Evelyn, then Vivien may not relax. Hence, the premises do not imply that Vivien will relax.
The conclusion is an illusion. The correct response is that it is impossible to know what will
happen. The aim of the experiment was to test whether naı ¨ve individual succumbed to the
illusory inferences.
Method. Each participant carried out four inferences in a random order: the illusory inference
above, an analogous illusion based on prevent, and two control problems for which the
failure to represent falsity should not yield errors (see Table 8). The problems concerned
everyday matters, as in the example above, and the contents were allocated twice to the four
forms of inferences. We tested 20 Princeton Undergraduates individually, who were fulﬁlling
a course requirement. Their task was to state what conclusion, if any, followed from the
premises. The instructions emphasized that in each initial pair of premises one assertion was
true and one was false.
Results and discussion. Table 7 presents the percentages of participants making each re-
sponse. One participant responded “impossible to know” to all the problems, including the
controls, and so we rejected his data. The remaining participants tended to succumb to the
illusions, making them more often than one would expect by chance (Binomial test, p ,
.02). Likewise, they were correct more often on the control problems than on the illusory
inferences (p 5 .5
19). Readers may worry that the participants merely overlooked that
one of the initial assertions was true and one was false. The instructions made this point
as clear as possible, and other studies have deliberately varied the rubrics and yet still
the participants erred. Their think-aloud protocols showed that they had not overlooked
the nature of the rubrics (Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999). The results accordingly
support the model theory, but they are contrary to theories based on formal rules or
schemas. These theories contain only logically impeccable rules, and the only way in
which they could yield invalid conclusions is by a mistake in their application. Such
mistakes, as Rips (1994, p. 385) has rightly pointed out, should have “diverse sources,”
and so “a uniﬁed account of errors seems extremely unlikely.” It strains credulity to
imagine that errors of this sort could lead most reasoners to one and the same invalid
conclusion. In contrast, the model theory predicts the illusions on the grounds that
mental models fail to represent what is false.
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We have advanced a new theory of causality as conceived in everyday life by people with
no training in philosophy or logic. The theory gives an account of the meaning of causal
relations, their mental representation, and their deductive consequences. It depends on ﬁve
principles:
1. Truth: People represent propositions by constructing mental models in which each
model represents what is true in each possibility compatible with the premises.
2. Temporal constraint: If A has a causal inﬂuence on B, then B does not precede A in
time.
3. Causal modalities: The meaning of a causal relation between two states of affairs, A
and B, concerns what is possible and what is impossible in their co-occurrences. The
principle applies to general causal claims (represented in a single model of possible
states) and to singular causal claims (represented in a set of models of possibilities).
4. Circumstantial interpretation: Causal interpretation depends on how people conceive
the circumstances of states, that is, on the particular states that they consider to be
possible, whether real, hypothetical, or counterfactual.
5. Causal deduction: Individuals base their causal deductions on mental models of the
premises, inferring whatever conclusion, if any, has the possibilities corresponding to
those of the premises.
Does the mere existence of the relevant set of possibilities satisfying the temporal
constraint sufﬁce for a causal relation? Or, could there be cases that satisfy our analysis but
that are not causal? “Many things,” Cheng (1997, p. 367) writes, “follow one another
regularly, yet one does not infer a causal relation between them.” She cites the case of a
rooster that crows every day just before sunrise. On our analysis, however, the claim that the
rooster’s crowing causes the sun to rise means that the rooster cannot crow at any time of
Table 7
The two illusions and the two control problems of Experiment 5 (stated in abbreviated form). The table
shows the percentages of participants (N 5 19) making each response.
Illusions Control problems
1. One is true and one is false: 19. One is true and one is false:
A will cause B. A will cause B.
Not-A will cause B. Not-A.
Deﬁnitely true: Deﬁnitely true:
AA
[ B: 68 [ B: 100
Impossible to know: 32
2. One is true and one is false: 29. One is true and one is false:
A will prevent B A will prevent B.
Not-A will prevent B Not-A.
Deﬁnitely true: Deﬁnitely true:
AA
[ Not-B 53 [ Not-B 89
Impossible to know: 47 Impossible to know: 11
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rooster would indeed be said to cause the sunrise (without presupposing any causal mech-
anism). Some alternative views about causation are that causes and enabling conditions do
not differ in meaning, that causation is a probabilistic notion, that its meaning refers to a
mechanism, that deductions about causal relations depend on schemas or rules of inference,
and that causal meanings and principles of reasoning differ from one domain to another. If
our theory is right, then each of these views, which we discuss in turn, is wrong.
5.1. Causes differ in meaning from enabling conditions
The model theory implies that there are four weak causal relations (A will cause B, A will
prevent B, A will allow B, and A will allow not-B). Experiment 1 showed that individuals
distinguish between these relations. They tended to generate the predicted sets of possibilities
(and impossibilities) for each relation. From Mill (1874) onwards, however, the consensus
has been that causes and enabling conditions do not differ in meaning or logic. This view has
in turn led psychologists to search for some other difference between them. They have
proposed many putative distinctions–enabling conditions are normal and causes abnormal,
enabling conditions are common and causes rare, enabling conditions are constant and causes
inconstant, and so on (see Table 1). But, as the model theory predicted, naı ¨ve individuals in
Experiment 1 distinguished between their meanings. Given an assertion, such as: Using the
new fuel will cause the engine to survive the test, all but one of the participants listed as
impossible the following situation: Use of the new fuel and the engine does not survive the
test. But, given the assertion: Using the new fuel will allow the engine to survive the test,
most participants listed as impossible the following situation: Not using the new fuel and the
engine survives the test.
The model theory postulates that causal status in complex cases is determined by the set
of possibilities as a whole, that is, the circumstances. In one set of circumstances, for
example, if there is sunlight, then fertilizer causes ﬂowers to grow. In a contrasting set, the
causal roles can be swapped round: if there is fertilizer, sunlight causes the ﬂowers to grow.
An ideal way to test the difference would be to ask people to put into their own words the
relevant sets of possibilities, but there is no magical way to inject a set of possibilities into
someone’s head. In Experiment 2, we therefore described them in other terms, that is,
without using any causal expressions. The participants’ task was to identify which was the
cause and which was the enabling condition. They were able to do so in a highly reliable
way. The experiment thus replicated Cheng & Novick (1991) but with an important
difference. It showed that individuals can distinguish between causes and enabling condi-
tions when neither is constant in the circumstances. Likewise, as the experiment showed,
they may judge that a passive agent, for example, sunlight or the presence of oxygen, is the
cause, and that an active agent, for example, fertilizer or a spark, is the enabling condition.
If there is tendency to judge active agents as causes in everyday life, then it may reﬂect a
pragmatic shortcut rather than a full understanding of the circumstances.
The distinction in meaning between causes and enabling conditions yields different logical
consequences. Causal premises such as:
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She will eat protein.
imply the consequent: Therefore, she will gain weight. But, enabling premises such as:
Eating protein will allow her to gain weight.
She will eat protein.
do not imply the consequent. She may, or may not, gain weight. Experiment 3 corroborated
these predictions: the two sorts of claim are logically distinct. The factors invoked by
psychologists to distinguish between causes and enabling conditions (see Table 1) are neither
necessary nor sufﬁcient to explain the difference between their logical properties. The
difference in their meanings sufﬁces.
5.2. The meanings of causal relations are not probabilistic
Just as a philosophical view about causation led psychologists to discount a semantic
distinction between causes and enabling conditions, so too another philosophical view has
led them to hold that the meaning of causal relations in everyday life is probabilistic.
Probabilistic theories may be viable in metaphysics and in scientiﬁc conceptions of causa-
tion, especially since the development of quantum mechanics (see e.g., von Mises, 1957,
Sixth lecture). Probabilities may enter into the induction of causal relations from observa-
tions (Pearl, 1988; Shafer, 1996; Cheng, 1997; Lober & Shanks, 1999). Likewise, a causal
assertion may differ in its probability, that is, some causal assertions are highly probable
whereas others are highly improbable. But, are we to suppose that causal relations them-
selves have meanings that are probabilistic?
This view would have astonished Hume (1748/1988), who took a causal claim to apply
universally with a constant conjunction of cause and effect. It would have astonished Kant,
who argued that causation was an a priori notion which demands “that something, A, should
be of such a nature, that something else, B, should follow from it necessarily” (Kant,
1781/1934, p. 90). It would have astonished Mill, who wrote: “The invariable antecedent is
termed the cause; the invariable consequent, the effect” (Mill, 1874, p. 237). Indeed, Russell
(1912–13) took the view that the concept of causation should be expurgated from philoso-
phy, because it had been replaced by probabilistic correlations in science. That the concept
of cause itself might be probabilistic appears to be a doctrine unique to the world post
quantum mechanics.
The principal evidence lending support to the probabilistic doctrine is that people assent
to causal claims even when they know there are exceptions to them. Loose generalizations
are endemic in daily life. Hence, most people assent to the proposition:
Smoking causes lung cancer
even though they know that not everyone who smokes gets the disease. But, most people are
also likely to assent to the more accurate proposition:
Smoking often causes lung cancer.
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causes were intrinsically probabilistic, then the two assertions would not differ in meaning.
Another factor in the use of loose causal generalizations may be that people are well aware
that many causes in everyday life yield their effects only if the required enabling conditions
are present and the potentially disabling conditions are absent. Naive individuals, as Cum-
mins (1995, 1998) has shown, are sensitive to these factors. Hence, when people assent to
the loose generalization about smoking, they are granting the effect other things being equal.
As Cummins remarks, they mean that the causal relation holds unless some disabling
condition is present.
In our view, a probabilistic meaning of causality does not accord with everyday usage, as
several strands of evidence show. The ﬁrst strand of evidence is that naı ¨ve individuals in
Experiment 1 judged that certain possibilities are ruled out by causal assertions. Given, for
example, the assertion: Running the new application will cause the computer to crash, they
listed as impossible the following situation: Running the new application and the computer
does not crash. Suppose on the contrary that the probabilistic theory were correct. It would
follow that the causal assertion means merely that the probability of the computer crashing
given that one runs the new application is higher than the probability of it crashing given that
one does not run the new application. In this case, it is possible that one runs the new
application and the computer does not crash. The only way to refute the causal claim would
be to make a set of observations to show that the relative frequencies of crashes supported
the difference between the two conditional probabilities. Defenders of the probabilistic
approach might counter that the “demand characteristics” of Experiment 1 forced the
participants to list both what is possible and what is impossible. But, this claim is refuted by
the fact that the majority of the participants treated the tautology as consistent with all
possibilities, that is, they did not list any situation as impossible in this case. Jonathan Evans
(personal communication) has suggested that the use of singular events rather than general
causal claims might have discouraged probabilistic interpretations in Experiment 1. In fact,
we have run a study with general claims that yielded very similar results. Moreover, if
causation is a probabilistic notion, then it should be probabilistic for both singular and
general claims. Consider the following problem:
Smoking causes lung cancer.
Pat smoked but did not get lung cancer.
Why was that?
As we observed anecdotally, people tend to make the following sorts of response: Perhaps
Pat had a strong resistance to cancer, he might not have smoked much, or he may have given
up smoking. They do not respond: Because that is the nature of causation. Yet, this answer
is correct according to the probabilistic theory. In short, Hume (1739/1978) may have been
right when he argued that people treat chance as a case of a hidden cause.
The second strand of evidence derives from the distinction between causes and enabling
conditions. Consider a set of possibilities stated with their frequencies of occurrence (out of
100), as in the following partition:
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Sunlight ØFertilizer Growth 20
Sunlight ØFertilizer ØGrowth 20
ØSunlight Fertilizer ØGrowth 20
ØSunlight ØFertilizer ØGrowth 20
It follows that:
p(Growth ? Sunlight) . p(Growth ? ØSunlight), i.e., .66 . 0
p(Growth ? Fertilizer) . p(Growth ? ØFertilizer), i.e., .5 . .33
Hence, both sunlight and fertilizer are causes according to the probabilistic theory, though
sunlight has the greater probabilistic contrast. Yet, as the model theory predicts, individuals
in Experiment 2 judged sunlight to be the enabling condition and fertilizer to be the cause.
The distinction between causes and enabling conditions might be reconstructed within a
probabilistic theory in the following way: A causes B means that B is very probable given
A, and A allows B means that B is quite probable given A (Jonathan Evans, personal
communication). This idea seems plausible, but it makes exactly the wrong predictions about
the example above. In fact, the probabilistic theory obliterates the distinction between causes
and enabling conditions. Yet people are sensitive to this distinction, and so the probabilistic
theory fails to account for the everyday meaning of causal relations.
A third strand of evidence demonstrates another difﬁculty for the probabilistic theory.
When probabilities are held constant, a manipulation of content can yield different attribu-
tions of causality (Legrenzi & Sonino, 1994; White, 1995; Koslowski, 1996). Such results
are clearly inexplicable if causation is equivalent to an assertion about conditional proba-
bilities.
A fourth stand of evidence comes from Experiment 3. It showed that naı ¨ve individuals
tend to draw deﬁnite conclusions from causal assertions. Given a causal premise, such as:
Eating protein will cause her to gain weight, and the assertion that she eats protein, the
majority of participants concluded that she will gain weight. But, if a causal assertion is
merely a statement of a high conditional probability, then the participants should have
refused to draw any deductive conclusion. At the very least, they should have qualiﬁed their
answers in terms of probabilities.
A ﬁfth strand of evidence is that the probabilistic theory cannot explain cases in which a
cause decreases the probability of an effect (see e.g., Salmon, 1980). Here is an example from
Tooley (1987, p. 234–5). Disease A causes death with a probability of 0.1, and disease B
causes death with a probability of 0.8. Each disease, however, confers complete immunity to
the other disease. Given that an individual is in a certain condition, he is bound to contract
either disease A or disease B. In fact, a particular individual in this condition contracted
disease A, and as a result died. If he hadn’t contracted disease A, then he would have
contracted disease B, and so his probability of dying would have been 0.8. Hence, the cause
of his death (disease A), in fact, did not increase the probability of his death, but lowered it.
A ﬁnal strand of evidence comes from a paraphrase. A claim such as: If there were no
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Gravity causes planets to orbit stars. Nothing is uncertain in the meaning of such causal claims.
Indeed, to allow some uncertainty, one asserts: Gravity probably causes planets to orbit stars.
5.3. Do causal meanings refer to mechanisms?
At the core of the model theory is the modal principle that causes concern sets of
possibilities governed by a temporal constraint. But what of the other metaphysical principle
of causal powers or mechanisms? As we mentioned in Section 2, everyday causal assertions
often concern “action at a distance,” and they sometimes deliberately deny the existence of
an underlying causal mechanism. We therefore argued that it may be mistaken to build these
metaphysical principles into the everyday meaning of causality. Such a claim, however, does
not deny the existence of causal mechanisms.
You understand causal relations better when you have access to a mechanism, that is, you
have a dynamic mental model that can unfold over time (Johnson-Laird, 1983, Ch. 15). It
allows you to simulate the sequence of events and to infer causal consequences: A will cause
B, but B in turn may feed back and have a causal inﬂuence on A (Green, 2001). A mechanism
also provides a lower level of explanation. At one level, you know what the system does, and
at one level down you know how it does it (see Miyake, 1986). Suppose, for example, that
you can put your computer into sleep mode in different ways, such as pressing control1A
or control1B, or control1A1B. It seems that the two keys A and B have equivalent roles
given that you press control: Pressing key A or key B, or both, causes the computer to go to
sleep. But, consider the mechanism at one level down, namely, the circuit. If all you can
observe are the positions of the keys and their effect on the computer, it is impossible to
identify the circuit. In principle, there are inﬁnitely many distinct circuits in which the keys
might have their effects, just as there are inﬁnitely many distinct ways in which to compute
any computable function. If you can at least measure whether or not current ﬂows through
a key, you may be able formulate a description of the mechanism. You might discover, for
instance, that when key B is pressed, current ﬂows through it and puts the computer to sleep
independently from the position of key A. But, when key B is not pressed it completes a
series with key A, and so the computer goes to sleep only when A is pressed too. Hence, the
only effect of switch A is to close or to break this second circuit. This mechanism at a lower
level justiﬁes the description: Pressing key B, or pressing key A when key B is not pressed,
puts the computer to sleep.
What causes the current to ﬂow in these various circuits? A causal mechanism itself may
be further decomposed into a lower level mechanism, and at each level reference is made to
further causes. Hence, we can talk of a difference in potential that causes a ﬂow of electrons
in each of the circuits. But, this mechanism itself contains a causal claim: the potential
difference causes the ﬂow. Once again, we can ask in turn for its causal mechanism. And so
on ad inﬁnitum. Each mechanism at a lower level embodies a causal claim, and, like a child’s
series of “why” questions, we can go on asking for the mechanism underlying each answer
until we run out of knowledge.
The morals are threefold. First, mechanisms are not part of the meaning of causal
assertions, because causal assertions can deny their existence without contradiction. Second,
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phenomena for which it provides an account. To stipulate that a causal claim is an assertion
that a mechanism exists runs the risk of a vicious circle: you appeal to a set of causal relations
in order to give an account of the meaning of causation. Third, mechanisms and simulations
based on their mental models provide a powerful way of inferring causal consequences. They
can be crucial in inferring causation from correlations or other inductive observations (see
e.g., White, 1995).
5.4. Causal deduction depends on models, not rules or schemas
Although some theorists argue that causal relations cannot be deduced, but only induced,
we have shown that naı ¨ve individuals do make causal deductions. A common sort of causal
deduction occurs when you use your background knowledge to infer a causal interpretation
of a state. You know that an insulin injection prevents a coma in diabetes; your diabetic
friend gives herself such an injection; and you infer that she will not go into a coma. Of
course, your conclusion may be mistaken: all deductions based on empirical premises,
whether causal or not, are defeasible. That is, they may have conclusions that turn out to be
false because a premise is false. Likewise, the deductive process is not always straightfor-
ward. Santamaria, Garcia-Madruga, and Johnson-Laird (1998) gave participants a pair of
believable conditional premises, which each expressed a causal relation, such as:
If Marta is hungry, then she takes an afternoon snack.
If Marta takes an afternoon snack, then she has a light dinner.
Both premises are believable, and they yield the following valid conclusion: If Marta is
hungry, then she has a light dinner. Yet, the participants were reluctant to draw this
conclusion, presumably because it is unbelievable. It lacks the causal link (eating the snack)
between its antecedent and consequent, and so it violates the normal relation between hunger
and dinner.
Causal deductions could depend on formal rules of inference or on pragmatic reasoning
schemas. Experiment 4, however, corroborated the principle of causal deduction–that naive
individuals deduce causal relations from mental models of the premises. The experiment
showed that they tended to draw those conclusions supported by mental models of the
premises, whether or not the conclusions were valid. Experiment 5 established the occur-
rence of illusory inferences based on causal premises. Given premises of the form:
One of the following assertions is true and one of them is false:
A will cause B.
Not-A will cause B.
This assertion is deﬁnitely true: A
most participants inferred invalidly: B will occur. These illusions are a crucial test of the
model theory. It predicts their occurrence because mental models represent only what is true
(the principle of truth). Theories based on formal rules or pragmatic schemas, however,
cannot account for the illusions. These theories postulate only valid rules of inference, and
so they have no way to explain the systematic occurrence of invalid inferences.
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another.
Throughout this article, we have presupposed a uniform account of causation and causal
reasoning. A contrasting view is that causal reasoning differs from one domain to another.
Similarly, individuals may rely on, say, pragmatic reasoning schemas when they have
knowledge of a domain, but on mental models or some other “weak” method when they have
no relevant knowledge. In fact, a study of how people explain inconsistencies suggests that
there are strong uniformities across domains (see Legrenzi et al., 2001). In two experiments,
the participants were presented with sets of inconsistent assertions, and their task was to rank
order the probability of seven different putative explanations of each inconsistency. The
participants tackled four scenarios from ﬁve different domains: physics, mechanics, biology,
psychology, and socio-economics. They all rated an explanation consisting of a cause and an
effect as more probable than either the cause alone or the effect alone. This bias was uniform
over all ﬁve domains. Likewise, in the present studies, no striking effects occurred as a result
of the content of the problems, for example, health problems versus mechanical problems in
Experiment 1. There may be differences yet to be detected in causal reasoning depending on
domain or knowledge. So far, however, the hypothesis of uniform principles has survived
testing.
5.6. Induction and the model theory
The model theory has implications for the process of inducing causal relations from
observations. Knowledge of explicit possibilities, as we have seen, allows individuals to
deduce an appropriate causal relation from observations. It can also override data about the
relative frequencies of different sorts of event (see Section 2). But the theory of meaning has
implications for the interpretation of frequency data even where no knowledge is available
to aid the process. According to the probabilistic account of cause, the appropriate strategy
for interpreting a probability distribution is to assess the difference between the two
conditional probabilities, p(BïA )a n dp( B ïØ A), where A is the putative cause and B is the
effect. If the distribution is in the form of a 2 3 2 table of frequencies, then the data in each
cell have to be taken into account to compute these conditional probabilities. Naive indi-
viduals sometimes carry out this strategy (Lober & Shanks, 1999), but often they fail to do
so (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Mandel & Lehman, 1998). Some theorists have defended the failure
as adaptive (cf. Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; 1999), but Over &
Green (2001) argue convincingly that the correct Bayesian response must take into account
all four cells in the table. However, if causation has the meaning shown in Table 2, then it
is not necessary to take into account all four frequencies in order to establish a causal
relation. Indeed, what matters is not how often something occurs, but whether or not it occurs
(see Schwartz et al., 1998).
Suppose you want to test whether or not a set of observations supports the following
causal relation: Heating water to 100 °C in normal air pressure causes it to boil. If you
observe cases of boiling water at 100 °C, and no cases of water at 100 °C failing to boil, then
you are almost there. It sufﬁces to establish, if you don’t already know, that water is not
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water boils at another temperature is not strictly relevant to the causal claim. If it doesn’t,
then heating it to 100 °C is the unique cause of boiling; if it does, then heating it to 100 °C
is merely one cause of boiling. In more abstract terms, a causal relation of the form A causes
B, can be inferred from the occurrence of cases of A and B, and the absence of cases of A
and not-B, granted that B is not invariable. The mental models of the relation make explicit,
however, only the conjunction of A and B. Hence, the theory predicts that there should be
a bias towards this contingency in assessments of causation. Such a bias occurs, particularly
in situations in which there is more than one putative cause (Schustack & Sternberg, 1981).
Otherwise, individuals do tend to take into account cases of A and not-B (Einhorn &
Hogarth, 1978). With binary variables in the form of “present” versus “absent,” they are
likely to focus on the co-occurrence of the cause and effect. But, if both values of a variable
have to be represented in models, for example, “high” versus “low,” then participants are
more likely to take into account falsifying cases (Beyth-Marom, 1982).
When cases of A and not-B do occur, there are two possibilities: either A does not cause
B, or A may have occurred in the absence of an enabling condition –or, equivalently, in the
presence of a disabling condition. It becomes necessary to make observations of the
co-occurrence of potential enablers and disablers, and the circumstances may be as complex
as those that we spelled out for Experiment 2. It is not easy to determine the correct relations.
An effect may have multiple alternative causes; it may have multiple enabling conditions
(Hart & Honore ´, 1959, 1985). Where there are competing causes, as the model theory
predicts, people tend to focus on a single cause and to discount other potential causes
(Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982), just as they focus on single options in decision making
(Legrenzi et al., 1993) and single explanations in induction (Sloman, 1994).
6. Conclusion
Our results substantiate the model theory of causal relations. The theory is founded on a
few simple, but powerful, principles. The meanings of causal relations are sets of possibil-
ities in which an effect cannot precede a cause. Naive individuals can envisage these
possibilities in fully explicit models, but with complex descriptions they tend to rely on
mental models representing only what is true in the possibilities. They deduce the conse-
quences of causal claims from what holds in their mental models of the premises. Deductions
that they cannot make in this way are likely to be beyond them.
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